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I. INTRODUCTION
During recent decades, the rapid pace of financial markets involving new modes of management, governance, and regulation has framed
business firms. This corporate drift toward financialization is summarized under the “shareholder value” label. What do financial markets do?
Unequivocally, they organize trading on shares that are securities: tradable financial entitlements established by law, which formalize expectations, and claims of financial rents paid by the issuing company.1 Actually, how continued quotation on share exchanges came to be the barometer of economic or social welfare is a different matter. The latter
adoption has required quite a great leap from “the euthanasia of the rentier, of the functionless investor”2 involving changes in, and reforms of,
monetary and financial architectures at policy-making and regulatory
levels; banking and financial institutions; shareholding, monetary, and
*
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1. Together with shares, including their issuance and buyback, other financial arrangements
deal with the linkage of finance to business activities, including bonds and debts, structured financial
instruments, stock options, and pension schemes.
2. JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 376
(1936) (emphasis added).
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investment funds (including pension and insurance); and the management, organization, and accounting of business firms. This general trend
has been further shaped by transnational imitation between various socioeconomic environments and regulatory regimes, led by some global
institutions.3
The shareholder value revolution has involved peculiar beliefs and
ideas on (1) what financial markets can actually do, and (2) what they are
indirectly concerned with—that is, ongoing firms having internal organization and management. Shareholder value relates to the efficient financial markets rhetoric (point 1).4 Behind its academic foundations in the
late developments of neoclassical financial economics,5 securities market
makers utilize this rhetoric to affirm their social role and advertise their
financial “products” to clients and citizens. Belief in the magic of the
share exchange is fuelled, and firms become the very commodity that
trading is constructed upon. Financial markets trade on legal entitlements
whose “values” relate—in principle—to financial performance and position of business firms.6 In order to be submitted to securities markets—
today considered as the center of economy and society—business firms
have been reduced to financial placements (point 2). The peculiar efficient market rhetoric already applied to the working of financial markets
is then replicated within the firm. The latter comes to be seen as a portfolio of disparate financial assets and liabilities held on behalf of investors,
who trade on shares issued by the firm itself. On this basis, shareholder
value has reshaped the corporate activity, fostering new practices of integrated financial management.7
3. See generally VINCENT BIGNON, YURI BIONDI & XAVIER RAGOT, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
FAIR VALUE: ACCOUNTING AS A VECTOR OF CRISIS (2009); SPECIAL ISSUE: THE SOCIOECONOMICS OF ACCOUNTING, 5 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 585 (Yuri Biondi & Tomo Suzuki eds., 2007);
Richard Deeg & Gregory Jackson, Towards a More Dynamic Theory of Capitalist Variety, 5 SOCIOECON. REV. 149 (2007); Steven L. Schwarcz, Framing Address: A Framework for Analyzing Financial Market Transformation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 299 (2013); Karel Williams, From Shareholder
Value to Present-Day Capitalism, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 1 (2000); Yuri Biondi et al., Governing the
Business Enterprise: Ownership, Institutions, Society (Comparative Research in Law & Political
Econ., Working Paper No. 13/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440889.
4. See sources cited supra note 3 and infra note 7.
5. Cf. Yuri Biondi, Disagreement-Based Trading and Speculation: Implications for Financial
Regulation and Economic Theory, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Biondi, DisagreementBased Trading]; Yuri Biondi, Money Without Value, Accounting Without Measure: How Economic
Theory Can Better Fit the Economic and Monetary System We Live In [hereinafter Biondi, Money
Without Value], in MONEY AND CALCULATION: ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 34
(Massimo Amato, Luigi Doria & Luca Fantacci eds., 2010); Yuri Biondi, Pierpaolo Giannoccolo &
Serge Galam, What Does Financial Market Do? The Formation of Share Market Prices Under
Heterogeneous Beliefs and Common Knowledge, 391 PHYSICA A 5532 (2012).
6. Issuance from governments and other entities are neglected here for the sake of simplicity.
7. See generally Margaret M. Blair, Shareholder Value, Corporate Governance, and Corporate
Performance: A Post-Enron Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom, in CORPORATE
OF
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According to Karl Polanyi, classical and neoclassical economic
theories are characterized by an alleged extension of “our obsolete market mentality” to every socioeconomic activity.8 A combination of market and ownership then reveals the true value of everything through market prices, generating a spontaneous economic and social order among
liberated individuals. Polanyi’s seminal work, The Great Transformation, identified three “fallacious commodities”: land, money, and human
work.9 While these three human activities are significant for the economy
and society, they do not imply either the existence of, or the need for,
market coordination.
The same fallacy applies to the firm nowadays. Shareholder value
fallaciously reduces the firm to a commodity, taking the form of a tradable security. A firm is factually a significant socioeconomic activity, but
its reduction and reification to ownership rights traded on financial markets features the shareholder value rhetoric. While trading factually exists on shares and other legal entitlements issued through the legal structure of the firm, only the shareholder value rhetoric argues that the whole
economy of the business firm does—and should—depend on that share
market pricing throughout time.
This paper aims to address some theoretical problems with shareholder value that come from its misguided understanding of shareholding
and the business firm. Shareholder value relies on complementary views
that point to market and ownership to understand the dynamics of both
securities markets and the enterprise activity. But what happens when
shares, acquired at a definite price in a given circumstance, relate to the
enterprise congeries of legal and economic systems involving flows and
immobilizations that require an accounting system to explicate them?
GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (Peter Cornelius & Bruce M. Kogut
eds., 2003) (providing legal-economic preconceptions); William Lazonick, The Financialization of
the U.S. Corporation: What Has Been Lost and How It Can Be Regained, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
857 (2013); Williams, supra note 3; see also MICHEL AGLIETTA & ANTOINE REBÉRIOUX,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADRIFT: A CRITIQUE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE (2005) (providing insightful macroeconomic analysis); Robert Boyer, Is a Finance-Led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative to Fordism? A Preliminary Analysis, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 111 (2000) (providing insightful
macroeconomic analyses); Julie Froud et al., Shareholder Value and Financialisation: Consultancy
Promises, Management Moves, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 80 (2000) (discussing the managerial foundations
of shareholder value); William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A
New Ideology for Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 13 (2000) (discussing the managerial
foundations of shareholder value). In addition, Thomas Clarke edited a comprehensive collection on
theoretical foundations of corporate governance, entitled Theories of Corporate Governance: The
Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance.
8. See generally Karl Polanyi, Our Obsolete Market Mentality, 3 COMMENTARY 109, 109–17
(1947), reprinted in PRIMITIVE, ARCHAIC AND MODERN ECONOMIES: ESSAYS OF KARL POLANYI 59,
68–77 (George Dalton ed., 1968).
9. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 68–77 (1944).
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Financial crises, scandals, and shortcomings testify against the unholy trinity of market, property, and shareholder value. Instead of assuring ever-progressive advances in economic and social welfare, shareholder value proves to raise unaddressed issues of stability and fairness.
Enterprises that were its glorious forerunners, such as Enron and Lehman
Brothers, have generated material and fraudulent losses, encountering
evergreen troubles of sustainability, responsibility, and accountability.
The magic of financial markets turned to be black. Mark-to-market accounting, claimed to be “fair” value, was suddenly dismissed once market prices disruptively decreased and financial markets experienced systemic failures.10 Accordingly, many scholars have recently acknowledged that reforms are necessary to protect stakeholders, including
shareholders, but also human community and nature at large.
Together with regulatory and organizational changes, new beliefs
and ideas addressed in this paper were crucial in the ascension of the
shareholder value rhetoric. Remedying the current impasse, then, may
require not only careful exercises in regulatory reform and policymaking,
but also some theoretical upgrades. The misguided understanding of
what securities markets and firms are, or should be, has framed received
policies and the entire concern with “corporate governance.”
This Article engages this theoretical challenge by drawing upon the
concept of the firm as an “enterprise entity,” which has significant implications for governance and disclosure. It argues that the enterprise entity
is a comprehensive approach to the firm that integrates accounting, economics, and law, thus improving on the received understanding of the
firm. Part II discusses a framework based on the concept of the firm as
an enterprise entity. Part III then contrasts this framework with three
alternative views on the firm that jointly constitute the shareholder value
rhetoric: the “black box,” the “proprietor-entrepreneur,” and the “legal
person.” Further, these views are criticized as “daydreams.” Finally, Part
IV applies this comparative assessment to matters of corporate governance and disclosure, clarifying the novel approach to governance and
disclosure of the business firm.

10. On October 3, 2008, the so-called “Financial Institutions Bailout Bill,” also known as the
“Paulson Plan,” included two sections—132 and 133—relating to fair-value (mark-to-market)
accounting. The first gave authority to the SEC to suspend this method of accounting for reasons of
public interest and investor protection. The second section mandated further studies on its effects on
balance sheets of firms, its impact on the quality of financial information, its role on bank failures in
2008, the process used by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in developing related
accounting standards, advisability and feasibility of modifications to such standards, and alternative
accounting standards to those already in place concerning fair value. European Union authorities
took analogous decisions.
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II. THE FIRM AS AN ENTERPRISE ENTITY
The idea of the firm as an enterprise entity implies a comprehensive
approach that integrates accounting with economics and law, as the notion of entity is already common to all three disciplines and practices.11
This approach comprehends the firm as a managed, dynamic system,
jointly constituted by two basic relationships as shown in figure 1: the
enterprise core, which denotes the management of an economic organization mediated by an accounting system, and its governance, which makes
management accountable to various undertaking stakeholders for enterprise income and results (performance).
Figure 1: The Firm as an Enterprise Entity12
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This functional system is characterized by different “structures of
production”:13 institutional, organizational, and epistemic structures.14
11. THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW
(Yuri Biondi, Arnaldo Canziani & Thierry Kirat eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY];
Yuri Biondi, The Firm as an Entity: Management, Organization, Accounting (Università Degli Studi
di Brescia, Working Paper No. 46, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=774764.
12. Biondi, supra note 11, at 32.
13. See generally R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV.
713 (1992).
14. See id.; see also Biondi, supra note 11.
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The latter respectively relates to the place and role of institutions, internal organization, and knowledge within the firm. The concept of the enterprise entity aims to frame together these dimensions of the business
enterprise.15
Theoretically speaking, the entity approach reacts to a “sense of
lacking” in the current state of economic theory and practice concerning
the firm. Notwithstanding its theoretical and heuristic advances, a market
bias can be identified in received approaches to the enterprise activity.
This bias leads to an understanding of socioeconomic dynamics on a
distinctive individualistic vein, neglecting collective and dynamic dimensions that feature the enterprise activity over time. Conversely, the enterprise entity approach employs insightful suggestions from leading scholars, such as the following: Simon, who addresses the special economic
organization of the firm as a dynamic system;16 Shubik, who deals with
the relationship between accounting and the critique of equilibrium economics of the firm;17 Coase, who explores the accounting contribution to
the theory of the firm;18 and Berle, who criticizes the classical view of
the proprietor-entrepreneur under the economic and financial conditions
that have characterized firms since the twentieth century.19 Moreover, the
enterprise entity approach draws upon traditions of thought from economics, accounting, and law that address the business firm and its impact
upon economy and society, especially the continental European tradition
of accounting and business economics20 and old institutional economics
developed both in the United States and Europe.21 All together, these
theoretical perspectives offer a solid background for understanding the
firm as an entity: a whole, dynamic system. Accordingly, the firm is then
(1) understood as an enterprise entity (dynamic system), (2) characterized by a specific economic and monetary process, which (3) generates
incomes to the firm, (4) while being confronted with the actual dynamics

15. Biondi, supra note 11.
16. See generally Herbert A. Simon, Organizations and Markets, reprinted in THE FIRM AS AN
ENTITY, supra note 11, at 54.
17. See generally Martin Shubik, Accounting and its Relationship to General Equilibrium
Theory, reprinted in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11, at 73.
18. See generally Ronald H. Coase, Accounting and the Theory of the Firm, reprinted in THE
FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11, at 82.
19. See generally Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Impact of the Corporation on Classical Economic
Theory, reprinted in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11, at 92; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory
of Enterprise Entity [hereinafter Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity], reprinted in THE FIRM AS
AN ENTITY, supra note 11, at 186.
20. ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS ECONOMICS: INSIGHTS FROM NATIONAL TRADITIONS (Yuri
Biondi & Stefano Zambon eds., 2012).
21. See generally THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11. For references to recent advances,
see infra Part V (concluding).
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and complexity of socioeconomic reality (unfolding and undetermined).22
The entity approach has implications for corporate systems of governance and disclosure.23 Significantly, accounting systems are integral
parts of the institutional framework of the enterprise entity, demonstrating the joint implications of economic, accounting, and legal matters
within the firm. In an enterprise affair fraught with unfolding changes—
together with asymmetries of resources, access, control, and information—the accounting system copes with the economic and monetary
process generated by the whole enterprise over time, defining the representation of entity capital (assets and liabilities) and income (revenues
and costs). In this way, the accounting system allows this special process
to exist and function autonomously from, and interactively with, shareholding and trading. Thus, accounting systems lie at the core of the continuity and sustainability of the enterprise entity, mediating immanent
conflicts of interests among various stakeholders, including shareholders.24
This comprehensive understanding of the firm as an enterprise entity contrasts with the shareholder value rhetoric, which frames the firm
with securities markets and ownership rights. A market basis reduces the
whole firm to a “black box,” while an ownership basis submits it to a
lonely proprietor-entrepreneur or an autocratic “legal person.” The following part provides a comparative analysis of these four approaches to
the socio-economy of the business firm.
III. BEHIND SHAREHOLDER VALUE RHETORIC
The view of the firm as an enterprise entity contrasts with three alternative views that jointly compose the shareholder value rhetoric. The
firm is either made entirely dependent on external markets (especially
securities markets), or framed with, and submitted to inside ownership
rights or outside legal order as shown in table 1 below. Overall, this
rhetoric entirely submits the economy of the firm to the primacy of
shareholders, as stated by an accounting scholar quoting Milton Friedman in the 1960s:

22. See Biondi, supra note 11.
23. See generally THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11; Yuri Biondi, What Do Shareholders
Do? Accounting, Ownership and the Theory of the Firm: Implications for Corporate Governance
and Reporting, 2 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2012).
24. Yuri Biondi, The Problem of Social Income: The Entity View of the Cathedral, 34 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1025 (2011) [hereinafter Biondi, The Problem of Social Income]; Yuri Biondi, The Pure
Logic of Accounting: A Critique of the Fair Value Revolution, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Biondi, The Pure Logic of Accounting].
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The proprietary concept [of the firm] seems to personify the traditional, classical ideology of capitalism. This is reflected in a statement by the economist, Milton Friedman, a prominent advocate of
that ideology, when he decries the concept of social responsibility
that many corporate officials “profess” to have adopted: “Few
trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our
free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for the stockholders
as possible.”25

He further states that “[t]he corporation is an instrument of the stockholders who own it.”26 Friedman can be taken as one influential epigone
of the tradition of thought already criticized by Karl Polanyi in its general premises and implications.27 In this way, the shareholder value rhetoric has disseminated distinctive daydreams that table 1 summarizes and
compares with the enterprise entity approach advocated in this Article.
These daydreams are dissipated in the following comparative analysis.

25. Reginald S. Gynther, Accounting Concepts and Behavioral Hypotheses, 42 ACCT. REV.
274, 279 (1967) (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962)).
26. Id. (quoting FRIEDMAN, supra note 25).
27. Jean-Philippe Robé, Being Done with Milton Friedman, 2 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2012).
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Table 1: Four Distinctive Views of the Firm
Enterprise
entity

Black Box

ProprietorEntrepreneur

Legal
Person

Basic
Concept

A complex
dynamic system or whole

A shallow
nexus of
(market)
prices or
(complete)
contracts

Ownership
and wealth

Analogy
with human
persons

Functioning

A specific
economic and
monetary
process

A mechanical
link between
price and cost
for each product separately
(marginal cost
pricing)

A legal and
economic
device for the
solitary owner

Autocratic
(plutocratic)
organization
with incorporated
duties and
rights

Purpose

Generation of
income to the
firm, related
to the satisfaction of individual and
social needs

A unique
objective of
“profit maximization”

A unique
objective of
generation of
rents from
wealth

A unique
objective of
selfperpetuating
generation
of profits
and rents

Conditions

Under actual
dynamics and
complexity of
socioeconomic
reality (unfolding and
undetermined)

Under idealized conditions abstracted away
from hazard
and context

Under ideal
conditions of
complete
contracting
and enforcement

Under ideal
conditions
of complete
legal order
and enforcement

A. Daydreaming of the Firm as a “Black Box”
Some endorsers of shareholder value more or less explicitly refer to
the conception of the firm as a “black box.” This view points to a neoclassical economic posture that pretends to understand the firm on a
market basis; the inner intricacies of the business are “blacked out” to
those outside, while external market prices for inputs (including fictitious
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commodities such as land, money, and human work) and outputs capture
the economic and monetary process of the firm. In fact, the history of
economic thought sheds some light into this no-longer-empty box. On
the contrary, this market approach to the firm provides a peculiar understanding based upon (1) a shallow nexus of (market) prices or (complete)
contracts, characterized by (2) a mechanical link between price and cost
for each product separately (marginal cost pricing), and (3) a unique
objective of “profit maximization”—a profit that shall result to be null,
like in the punishment of Tantalus,28 (4) under idealized conditions abstracted away from time, hazard, and interaction.29
This set of assumptions allows the firm as such to vanish in a system of efficient market pricing. The whole firm no longer has any role in
economy and society. Indeed, what about corporate governance and social responsibility of its management? If managers should disclose information about their activity and the business incomes generated, they
may discharge their responsibility upon markets that they must follow.
Markets, especially the share exchange, are then at the core of the economics of the firm.
B. Daydreaming of the Firm as a Proprietor-Entrepreneur
Some advocates of shareholder value argue for another daydream,
which understands the firm as a legal-economic device of its proprietorentrepreneur.30 This time, the firm disappears in favor of this lone captain
of his own business. This capitalistic hero alone bears the risks, undertaking the management of the entire enterprise. The firm and its personnel are nothing but his instruments, playing no role in decision making,
organization, or control, because the solitary owner is all that matters.
This approach understands the firm as the following: (1) a form of ownership and wealth, providing (2) a legal and economic device for the
28. In Greek mythology, Tantalus (Greek Τάνταλος, Tántalos) suffered an eternal punishment
in Tartarus. Tantalus was made to stand in a pool of water beneath a fruit tree with low branches
with the fruits ever eluding his grasp and the water always receding before he could take a drink. He
was the son of the nymph Plouto (“riches,” as in gold and other mineral wealth) and the grandchild
of Chthonia (“Earth”). From the name “Tantalus” originates the English verb “to tantalize.”
29. Shubik, supra note 17; see also Martin Shubik, A Note on Accounting and Economic
Theory: Past, Present, and Future, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2011).
30. We must insist here on the presence of only one entrepreneur or a mythical existence of
one universal and fully homogeneous class of them, because absent such an individualistic and
reductionist assumption, the presence of several heterogeneous proprietor-entrepreneurs would
include an interactive and holistic dimension that this approach purposefully excludes and is unable
to deal with. Lynn Stout masterfully explains this concept in her article New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy,” 2 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2012). See also Jack Hirshleifer, Investment Decision
Criteria, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate &
Peter Newman eds., 1987).
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solitary owner, (3) with a unique objective of generating rents from that
wealth, (4) under ideal conditions of complete contracting and perfect
enforcement.
Once again, the firm as such disappears in a system of fully enforceable ownership rights. The whole firm has no role in economy and
society. Concerning governance and social responsibility of its management, the latter may discharge any responsibility upon the owner, whom
it must obey. Thus, ownership is at the core of the economics of the firm
under this approach.
C. Daydreaming of the Firm as a “Legal Person”
A further daydream understands the firm as an artificially created
legal person having its own life, including citizenship rights, like a citizen that is a human being.31 This self-serving giant runs its business in a
world of pure law. All that matters then is this solitary legal person artificially incorporated by law or statute. This viewpoint understands the firm
as (1) a self-standing holder of ownership and wealth and (2) an autocratic owner and decision maker, (3) with a subjective objective of whatever the legal person wants under law or statute, (4) in a world of pure
law entirely comprised by, and reduced to, those laws and statutes.
This approach is often associated with the proprietor approach. As
stated by an accounting scholar in the 1950s, “[t]hose who believe the
accounting entity should be personified are known as the proprietary
theorists, and those who believe that the entity should not be personified
are known as the entity theorists.”32
Here, ownership is understood through an outside legal order established by laws and statutes, instead of an inside legal order based upon
ownership rights. But, as usual, the firm disappears in this framework,
reduced to an artificial person that legally exists as human beings do. If
management of this person should disclose information about its activity
and the business incomes generated, it may discharge any responsibility
upon that person whom it must obey. The firm is then reduced to one of
its legal forms, the corporation, which becomes an “island of absolute

31. See, e.g., Yuri Biondi, The Enterprise Entity and the Constitution of the American Economic Republic, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1 (2011).
32. Walter G. Kell, Should the Accounting Entity be Personified?, 28 ACCT. REV. 40, 42
(1953). John R. Commons refuted the personification of the going concern that constitutes the basic
unit of analysis in his institutional economics: “The false analogies may be condensed into three
analogies of mechanism, organism, and personification, since they consist in transferring to economics the ideas properly employed in physics, physiology, or individual psychology. These, we conceive, may be avoided by substituting the two ideas of transactions and going concerns.” JOHN R.
COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS PLACE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 96 (1934).
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power.”33 Considering that corporate law usually grants decision making
collectively to shareholders and their fiduciary delegates, the way is then
paved to a plutocracy that is problematic in a socioeconomic republic.34
D. The Problems with Daydreams Driven by Shareholder Value
However influential and significant these daydreams are, they involve problems that go beyond the emotional (and political) reactions for
or against them. These views are at odds with the reality of business
firms as they exist and function in our economy and society. For instance, firms combine a number of corporate and other legal arrangements (including contracts and regulations concerned with labor, investor
protection, financial securities, foods and drugs, environment, and antitrust). These arrangements jointly generate the triple separation between
ownership, control, and management (not only the separation between
ownership and control that is recently stressed) that Berle and Means
already recognized in their seminal work.35 To work through this legaleconomic web, management does not, and cannot, rely exclusively on
outside market pricing, but maintains accounting systems that are modes
of looking inside the ongoing enterprise process fraught with time, hazard, and interaction. Accounting systems, not price systems, enable actors—management, stakeholders, and regulators—to know, organize, or
govern that process.
Widespread conceptions of the black box, the proprietorentrepreneur, and the legal person contrast with this special legal and
accounting field generated by the enduring economy of the business
firm. Specifically, law and accounting provide evidence for the functional distinction between the firm and its alleged “owners.” The legal
structure of the firm involves a number of various legal forms (including
corporations) that hold and possess resources, enter into contracts and
33. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (“As D.H. Robertson points out [in the Control of Industry], we find ‘islands of conscious power in this ocean of
unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.’”).
34. A predatory plutocracy was stigmatized by Thorstein Veblen and Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Berle
wrote:
‘[A]bsolute control’ . . . [of corporations without property] was part of the plutocratic age
which prevailed through the last three decades of the nineteenth and the first decade of
the twentieth century, leaving a reminiscent mark on the culture of the United
States. . . . Perhaps there is a passing recrudescence of the era in Texas, due chiefly to
certain accepted loopholes in income tax law, to fortunate oil discoveries, and to a mass
upsurge in need for petroleum.
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL ECONOMY 72–73 (1959).
35. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).

2013]

Governance and Disclosure of the Firm

403

obligations, and have priority rights and control on flows, incomes, and
results.36 Furthermore, through the accounting system, prudential regulation and investor protection restrict dividend payments and equity repayments from the firm to its shareholders or partners. Through this
same system, fiscal regulation establishes the basis for income tax that is
determined and eventually paid out before net earnings are shared between shareholders and partners.37 Therefore, ownership by isolated individuals is framed and shaped by a “phantom” entity that the idea of a
“solitary owner” cannot cope with.38
In this context, the legal person transforms that phantom into a
“Frankenstein incorporated.”39 But a republican order establishes corporations and other legal entities as intermediary bodies that are objects, not
subjects, of the law.40 The legal person idea conflicts with constitutional
features of these bodies. In particular, the legal structure of firms comprises, or is disintegrated by, a myriad of legal entities and other legal
devices, which makes it hazardous to identify that person, even if artificial. These socioeconomic wholes submit a legal order, voluntarily and
compulsorily regulated by consent and the law. Specifically, they integrate the polity through a system of collective and continued decision
making governed by fiduciary representatives who run and supervise
those bodies on behalf of their constituencies, including shareholders in
the case of corporate law. Indeed, these bodies respond and are submitted
to a variety of inside and outside checks and balances to assure their consistent and continued role in economy and society. In sum, while legal
personality is a convenient legal device (or object) that is properly
framed and shaped by private and public orderings, the idea of an artificially created legal person is inconsistent with the integration of the firm
into the institutional framework of economy and society.
36. For example, any shareholder that used a corporate car for a day would likely be arrested—
quite a peculiar owner’s right in the firm indeed.
37. Reuven Avi-Yonah, Taxation, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Business Enterprise
(Comprehensive Research in Law & Political Econ., Working Paper No. 19, 2009) (discussing the
legal-economic foundations of taxation under different conceptions of the business firm); see also
Henrik J. Kleven, Claus T. Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, Why Can Modern Governments Tax So
Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15218, 2009).
38. Longstanding legal debates on the nature of public corporation deal with this issue, which
depends on a misleading focus on individual entrepreneurship and ownership. The notion of the
enterprise entity aims to encompass these debates by understanding the legal structure of the firm as
a system of multiple legal arrangements including, but not limited to, corporations. See generally
Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, supra note 19; Kurt A. Strasser & Phillip Blumberg, Legal
Form and Economic Substance of Enterprise Groups: Implications for Legal Policy, 1 ACCT. ECON.
& L. 1 (2011).
39. I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED (1931).
40. Biondi, supra note 31.
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Just as the legal person daydream is contrary to the reality of the
firm as an entity, the black box idea does not capture the entity phantom.
This view assumes that the price system (the market) is sufficient to represent, organize, and govern the business activity of firms. The firm is
then supposed to be neutral to socioeconomic dynamics; institutions
should not matter in the enterprise field. Accordingly, no enterprise inflows and outflows would exist except for efficient market prices.
In fact, the firm and its dynamics do matter in the economic and
monetary process. They generate a socioeconomic field that frames and
shapes the ongoing generation of income that all stakeholders, including
shareholders, have interests in.41 Representation, organization, and governance of this enterprise process require an accounting system, not a
price system, because the accounting system defines economic revenues
and costs attached to the reference period through “accruals,” the determination of the accounting entity perimeter, the retained concept of capital maintenance, and other technicalities that encompass the monetary
dimension. Contrary to the black box view, the firm cannot be reduced to
a simplistic “nexus of monetary flows (prices)” because the accounting
system goes far beyond the cash basis through its definition and application of accruals, consolidation, and other accounting technicalities.42
Moreover, prior financial literature has argued for the impact of
taxation and dividend policies on shareholder value.43 In fact, accounting
systems provide the basis of taxation and dividend distribution. This
accounting basis is not a market basis; rather, it enables the accounting
system to establish gross and net earnings through revenues and expenses, as well as assets and liabilities. These earnings may be partly or
fully distributed to shareholders or partners, and provide the basis to
determine enterprise income taxation, maintenance of prudential reserves, allowance of executive compensation, and so forth.44 All stakeholders, including shareholders, jointly hold interests in, and eventually
expect to be satisfied through, this income.
Thus, the accounting system provides a common representation of
business capital and income to the firm, which becomes a joint concern
over time. The accounting system structures this enterprise process of
becoming through time, establishing the firm as an enterprise entity. This
41. Shyam Sunder, Extensive Income and Value of the Firm: Who Gets What? (Comprehensive
Research in Law & Political Econ., Working Paper No. 20, 2009).
42. Biondi, Money Without Value, supra note 5.
43. See generally M.J. Gordon, Dividends, Earnings, and Stock Prices, 41 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 99 (1959); John Lintner, Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained
Earnings, and Taxes, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 97 (1956); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963).
44. See generally Biondi, supra note 23.
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enterprise process is concerned with uncertainties, bounded knowledge,
potential and actual mistakes, and disorganization. It is unfolding and
undetermined. Confronted with this process, the accounting system constitutes a special mode of representing, organizing, and regulating the
enduring economic organization and its becoming. It deals with price
formation, carried immobilizations (investments), overhead allocation,
and all the concerns that are at the core of everyday business activity
through time, space, and interaction.
In conclusion, the firm and its accounting system are not reducible
to a mere “nexus of market prices” based upon tradable ownership rights.
On the contrary, the accounting system constitutes an integral part of the
“institutional structure of production,” which can no longer be reduced to
markets, ownership, and legal forms alone. This approach leads to an
understanding of the firm as an enterprise entity that is functionally
shaped by the relationship between management, organization, and the
accounting system. Together, these constituents play an active role in the
economic and monetary process of creating and allocating resources
(production and distribution of wealth), along with accounting, mapping,
and mediating enterprise processes that link organization and management with the enterprise field. This understanding has significant implications for corporate governance and disclosure, which are discussed in
the following part.
IV. GOVERNANCE AND DISCLOSURE OF
THE FIRM AS AN ENTERPRISE ENTITY
Notwithstanding the factual problems with market and ownership
views mentioned above, we are free to pretend that either markets or
shareholders should dominate firms, and we should take full responsibility for the consequences of this choice. In fact, this has been the main
attitude for the last three decades of corporate governance and regulation.
For instance, an ownership view has been the basis of converging conceptual frameworks of financial reporting established by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in North America and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). In defining financial instruments with characteristics of equity,45 FASB states the following:
45. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., PRELIMINARY VIEWS: FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS WITH
CHARACTERISTICS OF EQUITY (2007). Through a joint project on liabilities and equity, the FASB
and IASB are seeking to address unresolved issues concerning classifying financial instruments as
equity or liabilities. As part of this process, the FASB issued its report, Preliminary Views: Financial
Instruments with Characteristics of Equity, describing three possible approaches—basic ownership,
ownership settlement, and reassessed expected outcomes—and from these selected the basicownership approach. Id. at iii.
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[A]n instrument would be classified as equity if it (1) is the most
subordinated interest in an entity and (2) entitles the holder to a
share of the entity’s net assets after all higher priority claims have
been satisfied. The holders of equity instruments are viewed as the
owners of the entity . . . . The underlying principle of the basic
ownership approach is that claims against the entity’s assets are liabilities (or assets) if they reduce (or enhance) the net assets available to the owners of the entity.46

As Jensen candidly argues, “[i]n the end, of course, we are all interested in normative questions; a desire to understand how to accomplish
goals motivates our interest in these methodological topics and in positive theories.”47 Milton Friedman’s “what if” argument may also be offered as a defense of this normative attitude.48 Still, while a theory is
obviously concerned with what is and what should be, it also concerns
what can be. Whether it has some predictive power or not, a theory’s
overall framing of facts and potentials is critical whenever recommendations on alternative actions and alternative regulatory regimes are under
consideration. Otherwise, poor policies may result, thus dampening
economy and society.
Contrary to shareholder value rhetoric, financial crises, scandals,
and shortcomings suggest that a market- and ownership-based approach
to the firm provides limited understanding. Its theoretical choice to ignore the firm has eventually transformed it into an unaddressed field of
overwhelming power. Consequently, the firm, as a phantom, haunts the
socioeconomic realm, and headlines reporting massive shortcomings
reveal how powerful this phantom can be.
Advocates of shareholder value have been concerned with public
(governmental) powers,49 but private (financial) powers can also raise
legitimate economic and societal concerns. It is astonishing to see how
recent neoliberal thinking criticizes governmental intervention, ignoring
private power use and abuse. But should a liberal perspective seek to
protect individuals from powers, both public and private? Should it prioritize human liberty, autonomy, and justice over laissez-faire in eco46. Id.
47. Michael C. Jensen, Organization Theory and Methodology, 58 ACCT. REV. 319, 320
(1983).
48. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953). For criticism
on this epistemological position, see Robert N. Anthony, The Trouble with Profit Maximization, in
THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11, at 186; Robert S. Kaplan, Comments on Wilson and Jensen,
58 ACCT. REV. 340 (1983); Herbert A. Simon, Discussion: Problems of Methodology¸ 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 229 (1963); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM.
ECON. REV. 493 (1979).
49. UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL 42 (2008);
Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (1998).

2013]

Governance and Disclosure of the Firm

407

nomic affairs? Liberal thinkers have legitimately called for institutions to
regulate the polity in order to generate a socioeconomic order that accommodates the immanent divergence and conflicts of interest among
individuals. Private and public orderings combine to generate governance and regulation that cannot merely be reduced to governmental intervention, while “deregulation” has no meaning in this context.
It is misleading to adopt a theoretical view that excludes, by assumption, immanent and potential problems that can occur and should be
addressed. This was the case with equilibrium approaches to financialmarket dynamics.50 This is the case with current approaches to the theory
of the firm as well. In contrast to the voluntary myopia that shareholder
value rhetoric defends, the view of the firm as an enterprise entity takes
the firm seriously. Pursuant to this view, governance and regulation of
business firms are upgraded from a logic of ownership and securities
markets to one of accountability,51 where the institutional framework is
designed and enforced to assure this accountability. The firm as such no
longer disappears from the economy and society; rather, it plays an active role in the process of creation and allocation of resources.52 Indeed,
what about corporate governance and the social responsibility of its management? Management controls ongoing business activities and business
incomes generated by the enterprise entity under its fiduciary responsibility; accounting systems are a key mode of this control. Under this
approach, management of the enterprise entity is the economic core of
the business firm, with significant implications for enterprise governance
and disclosure.

50. Margaret M. Blair, Making Money: Leverage and Private Sector Money Creation, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 417 (2013); see Yuri Biondi, Money Without Value, supra note 5; Alan Kirman,
The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic Theory: The Emperor Has No Clothes, 99 ECON. J. 126
(1989); see also HERBERT A. SIMON, AN EMPIRICALLY BASED MICROECONOMICS (1997); Shubik,
supra note 17; Masanao Aoki & Hiroshi Yoshikawa, The Nature of Equilibrium in Macroeconomics: A Critique of Equilibrium Search Theory, 3 ECON.: OPEN-ACCESS, OPEN-ASSESSMENT EJOURNAL 37 (2009), http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2009-37.
51. As a matter of fact, these three logics interact simultaneously in the actual field of the
business firm, constituting dynamic sources of tension, conflict, and transformation. Here, we are
theoretically arguing for a preference or hierarchy between them as a focus and principle of reference. See Marc T. Moore & Antoine Reberioux, Unearthing the Institutional Roots of AngloAmerican Corporate Governance, 40 ECON. & SOC’Y 84 (2011).
52. In a neglected paper, Gardiner Means explains stagflation—the simultaneous presence of
inflation and recession, including unemployment, in the macro-economy—with corporate power and
its “exercise of pricing discretion.” Gardiner C. Means, Corporate Power in the Marketplace, 26 J.L.
& ECON. 467, 476 (1983).
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A. Implications of the Enterprise Entity View for
Governance and Disclosure
In recent decades, governance and disclosure have been driven by
shareholder value rhetoric,53 which in turn relies on securities markets
and ownership for control. The “institutional structure of production” is
then expected to make shareholder power over corporate governance and
disclosure both operational and enforceable. However, even if coupled
with securities trading, ownership still cannot grasp the whole institutional structure of production. This structure is concerned with sustainability, accountability, and responsibility within the special field generated by the ongoing business firm. Accounting systems are an integral
part of this structure because they make the firm and its management
accountable. In this context, accounting becomes a way to represent,
organize, and regulate the dynamic system of the business firm. Even in
the complete absence of markets and ownership (and their alleged control over management), accounting systems assume an active role in representing, organizing, and governing the ongoing activities of the enterprise entity as a whole.
In turn, the firm itself constitutes a socioeconomic field fraught
with unfolding changes and asymmetries of resources, access, control,
and knowledge among different stakeholders, including shareholders,
and management. This field involves temporal, interactive, and holistic
concerns that cannot be addressed on individual or contractual bases. In a
world of pure law, every business activity can be controlled ex ante by
external forces driven by immediately enforceable rules and contractual
claims. This is strikingly analogous to the world of perfect and complete
markets, where outside market prices suffice to secure the socioeconomic
interests of each stakeholder committed to the business enterprise, where
every business activity would be controlled ex ante by external forces
driven by the price mechanism and monetary incentives. In contrast, in
the world of complex organizations concerned with unfolding changes
and limited rationality, every ongoing entity involves a financialeconomic core existing beneath the transactions formalized in contracts
and payments.

53. Yuri Biondi & Isabelle Chambost, Gouvernance, Transparence et Encastrement Cognitif
des Marchés Financiers: Le Cas des Analystes Financiers [Governance, Transparency and Cognitive Embeddedness: The Case of Financial Analysis], REVUE FRANÇAISE DE GOUVERNANCE
D’ENTREPRISE, Apr. 2009; Yuri Biondi & Antoine Reberioux, The Governance of Intangibles:
Rethinking Financial Reporting and the Board of Directors, 36 ACCT. F. 279 (2012), available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0155998212000221 (presented to the IPR Conference, “Governance, Intangibles & Corporate Social Responsibility,” in Collegio S. Chiara, University of Siena, on September 29, 2008).
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Within this financial-economic core, contracts are necessarily incomplete, and markets (when they exist) are never perfect. In this void,
the firm acquires a dynamic and collective dimension that generates a
field of power.54 As Berle recognized early on, legalistic reasoning cannot deal with this power because the formal conformity to rules may hide
unfair behavior, fraud, and abuses.55 This situation is at the very root of
the legal-economic concept of “equitable interest,” that is, a legitimate
interest that the bearer might be unable to defend through contractual
enforcement of rights and claims.56 The institutional system of protection—comprising governance and regulation—fills this void so as to
address the “equitable interests” of stakeholders, including shareholders,
relying on the firm for the joint accomplishment of goals, but substantially, though not formally, lacking contractual enforcement by courts or
market outward options. Public and private orderings combine then to
balance the interests of shareholders with those of other stakeholders,
and to protect those interests along with the continuity of the business
enterprise over time. This approach provides managers and judges with a
clue to comprehend the socioeconomic dynamics of the joint concern as
“fair” business conduct because it takes into account “other people’s
interests.”57
From this perspective, the institutional structure (including its accounting system) enters into the firm’s field as an accountability device
concerned with sustainability and responsibility of the joint-business
affair over time. This enterprise entity approach guides the institutional
analysis of the firm: (1) the entity is a “joint and becoming concern,
autonomous from stakeholders (including shareholders);58 (2) there is
separation between ownership and control, control and management, and
management and ownership; (3) “[a]bsentee ownership” (and the difference between the legal and economic frontiers) applies; (4) [a]ccounting
systems play a definite role in the enterprise process; and (5) accounting

54. THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11; Sadao Takatera & Norio Sawabe, Time and Space
in Income Accounting, 25 ACCT. ORG. & SOC’Y 787 (2000).
55. THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11.
56. See generally SABINE MONTAGNE, LES FONDS DE PENSION: ENTRE PROTECTION SOCIALE
ET SPECULATION FINANCIERE 46 (2006) (dealing with the emergence of the notion of “equity” and
“equitable interest” in trust regulation).
57. According to Adam Smith, the management of the affairs of a public company is concerned
with “other people’s money,” and this may eventually lead to negligence and profusion. ADAM
SMITH, THE INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 439 (1776).
58. This concept expands upon the notion of “going concern” that John R. Commons distilled
from legal-economic practices as a theoretical keystone of his institutional economics. The notion of
going concern was stressed by early accounting-entity theorists at least until the sixties. Cf. Biondi,
supra note 23.
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systems further distinguish this enterprise process from, and articulate it
with, the value (and valuation) of shareholders’ equity shares.
For matters of governance and disclosure, the enterprise entity constitutes a “joint and becoming concern” (point 1). Some legal and economic features define economic autonomy and continuity of the firm. In
particular, shareholders have limited financial liability and benefit from
an unconstrained right of “exit,” while prior legal protection is granted to
other stakeholders against shareholders in some circumstances. Moreover, through its legal structure—comprising a variety of legal forms and
arrangements, including corporations, vehicles, mandates, and fiduciary
duties—the entity acquires legal capacity to enter into contracts and obligations, to hold autonomous (collective) property, and to possess assets,
and it has priority in controlling cash flows, incomes, and results. These
features contribute to separate shareholding from the corporation that
issued those shares, as well as to separate the corporation from the whole
business enterprise.59 Additionally, enterprise groups feature the financial
structure and reinforce both separations.60 Together, these separations
point to the distinction between shareholding on the one hand, and management (namely possession) on the other. Only management is entitled
to dispose of assets and cash flow, and to organize the activity of the
business enterprise (point 2). In turn, this managerial power (or autonomous decision making) requires an institutional system of control for
regulation and supervision. Here, the notion of “absentee ownership”61
becomes critical (point 3): A large number of shareholders each holding
only a small part of shareholder equity, and excluded from relevant decision making, while influential insiders—including significant minority
shareholders, investment funds, and financial intermediaries—can control the firm at a distance by influencing managerial decision making and
rule making both inside and outside the firm.62
In this context, legal forms—related to corporate frontiers—are distinct from the socioeconomic frontiers of the firm, that is, the economic
substance of the business enterprise. This is the primary reason for accountants to look beyond legal forms to account for the business enterprise on a more appropriate basis (point 4). In turn, this implies the sepa59. Robé, supra note 27.
60. Strasser & Blumberg, supra note 38.
61. See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP (1923); Williams, supra note 3.
62. On the myth of diffuse ownership in the United States and abroad, see AGLIETTA &
REBERIOUX, supra note 7; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social
Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489 (2013); Julie Froud & Karel Williams, Private Equity and the
Culture of Value Extraction (Cent. for Research in Socio-Cultural Change, Working Paper No. 31,
2007); Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 22 (2009).
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ration between accounting system and the valuation of equity shares
(point 5). The reference to value is surely the most insidious issue raised
by shareholder value rhetoric. The latter reduces the firm to a security
that can be traded among allegedly homogeneous investors at current
market prices, which would be the best (or only) way to learn its intrinsic
value. “In a volume on economics recently published we find that ‘price
is a concrete manifestation of value.’ We are already familiar with the
incarnations of Buddha. To them we are now asked to add the incarnations of Value.”63
The mirage of value overshadows not only the individual features
and strategies of idiosyncratic investors but also the connection of every
investor to the business firm as a dynamic collective entity. The financial
and monetary process generated by the entity is reducible to past and
future cash flows, like a slot machine.64 But management and governance
of an enterprise group producing a range of products and services in dozens of countries and jurisdictions surely require a level of control and
representation that is not reducible to share market prices cashed out in
trading (if available).65 Therefore, instead of broadcasting the firm as a
proprietary placement, accounting systems are structured to provide relevant and reliable representation and control of consolidated accounting
entities. Furthermore, accounting systems enforce institutional regulations regarding dividend payments and repayments of shareholder equity,
provision of regulatory reserves, and retention of net earnings. The institutional role of accounting is reinforced by the fact that the enterprise
entity does not have to repay shares at their value—either market or accounting value—until liquidation, while shareholders can exit their investments by selling them through the share exchange. In sum, the institutional structure of the firm acts as a shield, locking in financial resources committed to the firm and required for the continuity of the enterprise over time.66 In this context, Fama’s rebuttal of the ownership of
the firm67 is partial, maintaining the “ownership” of financial capital and
empowering shareholders as residual claimants.68 Blair explains:
63. VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY 30 n.1 (Andrew Bongiorno & Arthur Livingston trans., Arthur Livingston ed., 1935) (1906).
64. In a similar vein, the Boston Consulting Group invented the expression “cash cow” to name
a business unit that is floridly established in a mature industry.
65. Through his prophetic style, Veblen strives to distinguish technological production and
progress, driven by engineering from a cash focus led by financiers, in the business enterprise field.
See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904).
66. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247 (1999).
67. Eugene F. Fama explains:
[O]wnership of capital should not be confused with ownership of the firm. Each factor in
a firm is owned by somebody. The firm is just the set of contracts covering the way in-
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[S]hareholder value advocates argue . . . shareholders act as the residual claimants, and also have certain control rights. So, advocates
believe, it is a useful, and not misleading, shorthand expression to
call shareholders the ‘owners.’ The rhetoric of ‘ownership,’ however, subtly redefines corporations in terms of the presumed property rights of one class of participants in the firm, thereby adding a
tone of moral superiority to the idea that corporations should be run
in the sole interest of shareholder. . . .69

However, shareholders own only their own shares, while financial resources are indefinitely committed to the business firm. Until and unless
liquidation occurs, shareholders remain creditors to the firm up to the
limit of committed financial resources that cannot be withdrawn at will,
as J.A. Schumpeter masterfully argued.70 Nevertheless, they are allowed
to exit their commitment by freely selling their shares. In this way, even
in the case of financial distress, they have limited responsibility and may
leave the firm before other constituencies with more dependent and specific commitments. On the point, in direct response to Jensen’s comments in 1983, Kaplan argues for an entity perspective:
The shareholder, as an owner of property rights in the decision making of the firm, is likely an anachronism at this time. The long-term
interests of the corporation are more likely to be vested de facto, but
not legally, with the managers, workers, suppliers, customers, and
the community of the firm. These economic agents have much more
non-diversifiable risk associated with the firm and a longer contractual history that the existing shareholders.71

Because the firm cannot be reduced and limited to its shareholders, its
relationship with shareholder claims should be addressed and clarified,
which is the focus of the next section.
B. The Enterprise Entity and Shareholders’ Claims
The operation of the firm as an enterprise entity frames and shapes
its relationship with potential and actual shareholders, including their
puts are joined to create outputs and the way receipts from outputs are shared among inputs. In this ‘nexus of contracts’ perspective, ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept.
Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 290 (1980).
68. Cf. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26
J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983).
69. Blair, supra note 7, at 57.
70. Yuri Biondi, Schumpeter’s Economic Theory and the Dynamic Accounting View of the
Firm: Neglected Pages from the Theory of Economic Development, 37 ECON. & SOC’Y 525 (2008).
71. Kaplan, supra note 48, at 343–44 (emphases added).
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remuneration. According to Shleifer and Vishny’s narrow definition,
“[c]orporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment[,]”72 in the form of either a market return (capital gains between buying and selling prices), or a comprehensive return including
dividends. However, the market value is external to the enterprise process (according to point 5 above), and the distribution of dividends is generally subordinate to, and constrained by, net earnings as determined by
the accounting system (point 4 above).
Therefore, shareholder remuneration depends on the status and role
of shareholding, its relationship to the firm as an enterprise entity, and
further on the shareholder connection to the business-enterprise field.
When asking what the firm does and should do for the shareholder, one
should conversely ask what the shareholder does and should do for the
enterprise. From the viewpoint of the enterprise entity, shareholder equity is a special source of financing. Accordingly, the accounting system
may recognize the shareholder’s claim on the business income generated
by the enterprise entity as a cost and allocation.73 Improved accounting
techniques—for instance, either a “Shareholders’ Equity Interest”74
based on the actual financial funds provided in the past, or a “Shareholders’ Equity Share” of overall net enterprise earnings as established in
some jurisdictions—may determine this remuneration, which is already
included in management-accounting systems. This method of accounting
recognition differs from the definition of shareholder value provided by
“Economic Value Added” (EVA)75 and other market-based metrics.76
Technically speaking, the latter metrics are variants of discounted present
value based on prospective cash flows to shareholders. EVA may be
formalized as follows:
EVA = (ROE – k) · Shareholders’ Equity =
Net Earnings – k · Shareholders’ Equity
The term ROE stands for the usual “Return on Shareholders’ Equity” and
refers to the annual ratio of net earnings on cumulated shareholders’ eq-

72. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737,
737 (1997).
73. See generally Biondi, supra note 23.
74. ROBERT N. ANTHONY, TELL IT LIKE IT WAS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING (1983).
75. Copyright © Stern Stewarts & Co.
76. See generally Froud et al, supra note 7.

414

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:391

uity, including nondistributed-earnings reserve.77 The term k is the estimated cost of shareholders’ capital. This determination of value added
for shareholders implies that the whole “residual income,” if positive,
should be allocated to shareholding.
In contrast, “Shareholders’ Equity Interest” (SEI) and “Shareholders’ Equity Share” (SES) may be formalized as follows:
SEI = i · Cumulated Shareholders’ Funds
SES = s · Net Earnings
The term i is the cost of committed shareholders’ funds as settled by
management, boards of directors, shareholder meetings, statutes, bylaws, financial securities arrangements, securities laws, regulatory bodies, or other institutional arrangements. The term s is the shareholders’
share of net enterprise earnings, with a value generally greater than or
equal to zero but less than one. In this context, the “cumulated shareholders’ funds” implies the separation between funds committed by
shareholders, including undistributed past SEIs or SESs, and entity equity, which is mainly composed by cumulated net enterprise earnings
after SEIs or SESs.78 This definition of shareholders’ remuneration implies that only a part of the whole residual income, if positive, may be
allocated to shareholders, the remainder being available for prudential
and environmental provisions, enterprise continuity, profit-sharing
agreements, or donation. This is the accounting way to assure the ongoing capacity of the enterprise entity to generate satisfying performances
and fulfil all its obligations over time, including but not limited to shareholders’ remuneration. This also constitutes a purpose and scope that can
be and has been instituted as an alternative to shareholder value maximization.
More generally, the EVA metric points to the fair value accounting
perspective that translates shareholder value rhetoric in accounting regu77. Financial analysis sometimes estimates shareholder equity at its market value, which is
inconsistent with the enterprise entity approach.
78. Both definitions, as well as EVA, imply the determination of the firm’s capital and income.
In turn, this determination depends not only on matters of accounting elements’ (equity, liability,
revenue, and expense) measurement, but also on entity perimeter, and on the recognition of accounting elements. Whether a transaction or a business unit is included in the entity or the distinctions
between equity and liability, revenue and liability, and expense and asset, has a distinctive impact on
capital and income, and thus on those measures of performance that deal with representation and
allocation of resources within the firm. Cf. Yuri Biondi, Cost of Capital, Discounting, and Relational
Contracting: Endogenous Optimal Return and Duration of Joint Investment Projects, 43 APPLIED
ECON. 4847 (2011); Biondi, Money Without Value, supra note 5; Biondi, The Problem of Social
Income, supra note 24; Biondi, The Pure Logic of Accounting, supra note 24.
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lation, while the SEI or SES improves on classic accounting systems
based on historical cost invested and revenue generated by the enterprise
entity over time. Further, shareholder value replaces the maintenance of
past nominal financial commitments with a new concept that includes the
opportunity cost of capital, defining shareholder equity in terms of capacity to earn the current market rate of return.79 But the enterprise entity
approach relies on the specific economic and monetary process of the
firm to deliver a financial performance that does not have a market basis.
“Historical cost” accounting fits and represents this enterprise process.
Incidentally, control of financial performance does not resolve
every matter for which the management of the business firm is accountable.80 Regarding this extra-financial dimension of the firm, shareholder
value is at odds with the justification of supplementary accounting systems for environmental and societal issues because, under this approach,
the social responsibility of business is anything but creating shareholder
profits as usual (echoing Friedman’s adage). Conversely, the enterprise
entity approach may easily provide a more integrated, comprehensive
view on accountability of business affairs. Examples of voluntary disclosure regarding this extra-financial dimension already exist, and some
jurisdictions have already made it compulsory.81
V. CONCLUSION
An institutional economic upgrade is required to better understand
the firm as an institution and organization with a distinctive role in economy and society. This Article has argued for a comprehensive approach
linking economics, accounting, and law around the common notion of
the firm as an enterprise entity.82 This theoretical development is original, but not isolated in the current debate. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy
speak about the management of off-contractual relations to understand
the socioeconomic core of the firm, while Rajan and Zingales are concerned with the integrity of this core against the “dark side of the ownership.”83 Blair and Stout argue for the autonomy and continuity of the
79. The International Accounting Standards Committee (nowadays International Accounting
Standards Board) suggested this conception for financial assets and liabilities. INT’L ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS COMM., ACCOUNTING FOR FINANCIAL ASSETS AND FINANCIAL LIABILITIES §§ 2.4–2.7
(1997).
80. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1990); Biondi, The Problem of Social Income, supra note 24; Blair, supra
note 7; Robé, supra note 27.
81. Biondi & Reberioux, supra note 53.
82. THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY, supra note 11.
83. See generally George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Bringing the Market
Inside the Firm?, 91 AM. ECON. REV 212 (2001); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a
Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387 (1998).
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legal-economic entity that concerns various stakeholders, including
shareholders, complementing this claim with a constructive critique of
the efficient financial market hypothesis.84 The enterprise entity view
understands the firm as a whole: a dynamic system of relationships, not
merely comprising contracts or bargaining. From this perspective, order
and disorder, efficiency and waste, honesty and guile, and development
and distress have much to do with the structure of these relationships
(more so than what existing theories have already recognized). This
comprehensive view provides valuable insight into better understanding
(1) the fundamental economic nature and very existence of the firm, (2)
the separation between ownership, control, and management, and (3) the
related systems of governance and disclosure required to control the
management of the firm as an enterprise entity.

84. See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 635
(2003); Lynn A. Stout, Inefficient Markets and the New Finance, 14 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATIONS 95
(2005); see also Lynn A. Stout, Risk, Speculation, and OTC Derivatives: An Inaugural Essay for
Convivium, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. (2011), commented on by Yuri Biondi, Disagreement-Based Trading and Speculation: Implications for Financial Regulation and Economic Theory, 1 ACCT. ECON. &
L. (2011), and by Pierre-Charles M. Pradier, Administering Systemic Risk vs. Administering Justice:
What Can We Do Now that We Have Agreed to Pay Differences?, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. (2011).

